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Abstract 
We consider project financing under adverse selection and moral hazard and derive 
several interesting results. First, we provide an explanation of why good firms issue both 
debt and underpriced equity (even if the bankruptcy and agency costs of debt are zero). 
Second, we show that, in the presence of moral hazard, adverse selection may induce the 
conversion of negative into positive NPV projects leading to an improvement in social 
welfare. Third, we provide a rationale for the use of warrants. We also show that a debt-
warrant combination can implement the optimal contract. Our results have a number of 
testable implications.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A large part of the securities issued by firms when they seek outside financing 
incorporate an option feature which provides the buyer with the right to buy the firm’s 
shares at a prespecified price. In their attempt to raise funds at better terms, firms have 
used several option-like securities. However, two particular securities are the most widely 
used: convertible debt and debt-warrant combinations. In the case of convertible debt, if 
conversion takes place then the debtholder exchanges the face value of debt with a 
prespecified number of shares. In other words, the exercise price of the option coincides 
with the face value of debt. In debt-warrant combinations the exercise price of the option 
can be determined separately from the face of debt and in most cases it is different. That 
is, convertible debt is a special case of a debt-warrant combination that obtains when the 
exercise price of the warrant equals the face value of debt. Although debt-warrant 
combinations constitute a considerable fraction of these issues, the theoretical corporate 
finance literature has focused on convertible debt and paid little attention to debt-warrant 
combinations.1 Existing models offer various explanations of why firms issue convertible 
debt but they do not justify the necessity for the use of warrants.2  
    In this paper, we construct a simple asymmetric information model that provides a 
rationale for the use of warrants. We abstract from taxes, financial distress, bankruptcy 
and other agency costs. We consider a model involving both adverse selection and 
(effort) moral hazard. There are two types of firms (projects): good (G), bad (B). Given 
identical effort levels, the success probability is the same for both types of projects but in 
case of success the good project’s return is higher (first-order stochastic dominance).3 In 
the event of failure, regardless of its type, the project’s return is zero. The entrepreneur 
can increase the success probability by exerting costly effort. Regardless of the project’s 
type, if the entrepreneur exerts effort the net present value (NPV) of his project exceeds 
the cost of effort whereas if he shirks the project has negative NPV. That is, exerting 
effort is socially efficient for both types. Both the project’s type and the entrepreneur’s 
action are private information of the entrepreneur. 
     As a benchmark, we first consider the case where moral hazard is not binding (pure 
adverse selection). In this case, the role of securities is to convey socially costless 
information about the type of the project. Equity issued by the G-type is more valuable 
whereas debt issued by both types is equally valuable.4 So, if the G-type issues some 
equity the B-type will mimic him and so in the resulting pooling equilibrium the G-type 
will subsidize the B-type through the mispricing of equity. However, in any pooling 
equilibrium where some mispriced equity is issued, the G-type has an incentive to deviate 
by issuing more debt (the relatively less valuable for him security). By doing so, he can 
                                                 
1 For example, de Roon and Veld (1998) report that about 30 percent of the convertible securities issued by 
Dutch companies from 1976 to 1996 were debt-warrant combinations.  
2 Green (1984), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), Stein (1992), Casamatta (2003), Cornelli and Yosha 
(2003) and Schmidt (2003) provide different rationales for the use of convertible debt.  
3 This assumption is made for simplicity. All main results go through if instead we assume that, given 
identical effort levels, the success probability of good firms is greater (first-order stochastic dominance).  
4 The market value of debt depends only on the success probability whereas the value of equity depends on 
both the success probability and the return in case of success which greater for the G-type. Thus, our results 
go through even if, given the effort level, the success probability of the G-type is higher. The only 
difference is that in this more general case debt will also be mispriced but less than equity.  
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credibly signal his type, reduce the mispricing and increase his expected return. As a 
result, no pooling equilibrium where some equity is issued can sustain. That is, the G-
type issues just debt to avoid selling an underpriced security (equity). 
     The introduction of moral hazard into an adverse selection framework has significant 
effects both on the combinations of the securities issued in equilibrium and their pricing. 
The distinguishing feature of this paper is the existence of a pooling equilibrium 
involving cross-subsidization across types and the issue of both debt and equity 
(warrants). This pooling equilibrium reflects a trade-off between information revelation 
and effort incentives. The securities issued by the G- and B-type are priced as a pool. 
Although, because of free entry of financiers, debt and equity (warrants) are fairly priced 
collectively, at individual level equity is mispriced. In fact, it is precisely this mispricing 
that provides the more prone to shirking type (B-type) with the subsidy necessary to 
induce him to choose the socially efficient high-effort level.5   
     Consider, for example, the case where the financial instruments available are debt and 
equity. In this case, in the pooling equilibrium the G-type subsidizes the B-type through 
the mispricing of equity. As we have seen, under pure adverse selection, the G-type 
would have issued just debt to eliminate this mispricing. However, in the presence of 
moral hazard, the elimination of the subsidy destroys the B-type’s effort incentives. The 
B-type shirks and the aggregate expected return falls. As a result, the financiers, in order 
for them to break even, ask for a higher interest rate on debt. This additional cost of debt 
exceeds the underpricing of equity. That is, since he cannot reveal his type, the G-type 
accepts to issue just enough equity to induce the B-type to exert effort because the 
resulting increase in his net expected return (due to the lower interest rate on debt) more 
than offsets the cost of the subsidy (the adverse selection cost of issuing equity).  
     Notice that as the proportion of the B-type increases, the fraction of equity needed to 
provide the B-type with the subsidy necessary to induce him to work also increases (the 
debt-equity ratio falls). The maximum subsidy is provided when only equity is issued. If 
the financial instruments available are debt and equity, for a sufficiently high proportion 
of the B-type, the pooling equilibrium where both types exert effort collapses although 
the G-type would have exerted effort even if a higher fraction of equity was issued (more 
subsidy was given to the B-type).  
     Warrants can help us restore the existence of the socially efficient pooling 
equilibrium. In absolute terms, the value of warrants issued by either type falls with the 
exercise price by the same amount. However, because in case of success the return of the 
G-type exceeds that of the B-type, the warrant value falls with the exercise price 
proportionately faster for the B-type. As a result, the B-type is willing to increase faster 
the fraction of equity offered to the financier than the G-type while still exerting effort. 
That is, the warrant payoff function can be steeper than the equity payoff function 
without violating the B-type effort incentive constraint. This implies that the difference 
between the total value of the warrants issued by the G- and B-type can exceed the 
                                                 
5 If funds are offered at fair terms, the G-type exerts effort whereas the B-type shirks. Hence, the B-type’s 
project NPV is negative and so, if his type is revealed, no rational financier offers funds to him. Therefore, 
in order to receive financing, the B-type will always mimic the G-type. Because, in case of success, the 
return of the good project exceeds that of the bad one, a given increase in the success probability leads to a 
greater increase in the net expected return of a good entrepreneur. As a result, good entrepreneurs may 
exert effort even if they subsidize the bad entrepreneurs. 
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corresponding difference of equity values consistent with both types working. Therefore, 
by choosing a sufficiently high exercise price, we can provide the B-type with the 
subsidy necessary to induce him to work when the proportion of the G-type is so low that 
the socially efficient pooling equilibrium breaks if a debt-equity combination is used.  
     That is, through the appropriate choice of their exercise price, warrants allow for the 
implementation of the socially efficient outcome even if this is not possible when we 
restrict ourselves to debt, equity and/or convertible debt.6 This result provides a rationale 
for their use. Finally, we show that a debt-warrant combination can implement the 
optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium.  
    Our results have several interesting implications. First, they provide an explanation of 
why good firms issue both debt and underpriced equity even though the bankruptcy and 
other agency costs associated with debt are zero. The issue of equity, through its 
mispricing, provides bad entrepreneurs with the incentives to work whereas debt is used 
to reduce the subsidy to the minimum required. What is more, because it relaxes the 
moral hazard constraint, the cross-subsidization occurring in this pooling equilibrium is 
socially beneficial. It results in the conversion of negative into positive NPV projects 
leading to an improvement in the aggregate expected returns and social welfare.  
     Our results have also some implications for empirical testing: i) The higher the 
proportion of low-profitability (B-type) firms, the higher the fraction of funds raised 
through equity. This prediction is consistent with the findings in Fama and French 
(2005).7 ii) As the proportion of low-profitability firms rises, more funds should be raised 
through the issue of warrants. To the best of our knowledge, this prediction has not been 
tested yet. iii) Because the G-type equity is more valuable, ex post, good firms have 
lower debt-equity ratios (market values). This negative relation between leverage and 
profitability has been documented by several empirical studies (e.g., Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002)).8  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
     This paper is more closely related to papers that try to explain the use of securities 
with option features based on some form of informational asymmetry: moral hazard 
(agency models) or pure adverse selection models. 
     In the celebrated Jensen and Meckling (1976) paper firms issue both debt and equity 
to minimize the sum of agency costs of these two securities. The agency cost of equity 
arises from the conflict of interest between management and outside shareholders. The 
                                                 
6 In our model, convertible debt does not improve on a debt-equity combination. If convertible debt is used, 
the exercise price of the option coincides with the face value of debt. This implies that if debt is converted 
into equity, the payment to the shareholders consists only of the project’s return. As a result, the maximum 
proportion of equity offered to the financiers consistent with the B-type working is exactly the same as 
under a debt-equity combination. In contrast, if a debt-warrant combination is used, the total payment to the 
shareholders, if the option is exercised, consists of two components: i) the project’s return and ii) the 
difference between the warrant exercise price and the face value of debt (which can be positive). Hence, the 
maximum proportion of equity issued consistent with the B-type working can be greater than under a debt-
equity combination.   
7 Fama and French (2005) report that during the period 1973-2002 the proportion of high-profitability firms 
declines while the fraction of funds raised through equity increases. 
8 Provided the securities issued are risky, our results hold true even if the two types of firms have identical 
projects but the good firms have assets in place that generate higher expected profits.  
 4
agency cost of debt stems from the conflict of interest between existing shareholders 
(managers) and would-be debtholders. The issue of debt induces the managers to 
undertake riskier projects that reduce the value of debt and transfer wealth from 
debtholders to shareholders (asset substitution problem).9        
     In this context, Green (1984) focuses on the asset substitution problem and develops a 
rationale for the use of convertible debt. Convertible debt reverses the convex shape of 
levered equity over the upper range of the firm’s returns (where conversion takes place). 
As a result, it alters the incentives of the shareholders to take risk and so mitigates the 
asset substitution problem.   
     Pure adverse selection models emphasize the signalling role of the financing decisions 
of the firm. Brennan and Kraus (1987) show that, under second-order stochastic 
dominance, fully revealing equilibria can be obtained by issuing convertible debt. 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) prove that, under first-order stochastic dominance, the 
issue of convertible debt coupled with equity repurchases leads to full information 
revelation. However, it should be noted that, in the absence of bankruptcy or financial 
distress costs, pure adverse selection models cannot explain why good firms issue equity 
even if it is underpriced.  
     Stein (1992) introduces financial distress costs and provides another justification for 
the use of convertible debt. In a three-type model, he obtains a fully separating 
equilibrium where the good type issues debt, the medium type issues convertible debt that 
is always converted into equity, and the bad type issues equity directly to avoid incurring 
the distress costs. In this separating equilibrium all firms invest and no distress costs are 
borne in equilibrium. If convertible debt were not used, this separating equilibrium would 
not, in general, exist and a situation similar to that described in Myers and Majluf (1984) 
would arise. 
     The justifications provided by Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987), and 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) for the use of convertible debt rely on the fact that its 
payoff is concave in the firm’s returns for low values of returns and convex for higher 
values.10 In Stein (1992), the usefulness of convertible debt stems from the presence of 
financial distress costs and the inability of a bad firm to force conversion. In our model, 
the mechanism at work is different. First, it does not depend on financial distress costs. 
Second, in our case, convertible debt does not improve on a debt-equity combination. Our 
mechanism relies on the fact that the warrant exercise price can be greater than the face 
value of debt. By choosing an exercise price higher than the face value of debt, we can 
make the difference between the total value of the warrants issued by the G- and B-type 
greater than the corresponding difference of equity values and provide the B-type with 
the subsidy necessary to induce him to work when the proportion of the G-type is so low 
that the socially efficient pooling equilibrium breaks if warrants are not available. 
     Notice that if types were observable, the B-type would not receive financing and so 
both investment and social welfare would be lower. These results contrast with those of 
pure adverse-selection models. In Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection leads firms 
                                                 
9 Notice that in our model there is no conflict of interests between shareholders and debtholders (no asset 
substitution problem) which, given the agency cost of equity, is the driving force of the coexistence of debt 
and equity in Jensen and Meckling.  
10 For the same reason, convertible debt is used to resolve informational problems in the context of venture 
capital financing (see, for example, Casamatta (2003), Cornelli and Yosha (2003) and Schmidt (2003). 
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to forego positive NPV projects whereas in de Meza and Webb (1987) it encourages 
firms to undertake negative NPV projects. Hence, in either case social welfare is lower 
than under full information about types. The key to this difference is that in the presence 
of (effort) moral hazard the cross-subsidization taking place in the pooling equilibrium 
relaxes this additional constraint and so it can be beneficial. In contrast, in these two pure 
adverse selection models there is no channel through which the cross-subsidy can have 
positive effects but it may have negative ones. 
     This paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the basic framework and 
develops the analytical tools. Section 4 provides some general results about the existence 
and the type of the equilibria where funds are offered. Section 5 analyzes the roles of debt 
and equity under pure adverse selection and adverse selection cum moral hazard. The role 
and usefulness of warrants are explored in Section 6. In Section 7, we show that, in the 
adverse selection cum moral hazard case, a debt-warrant combination can implement the 
optimal contract. Some brief concluding remarks are provided in Section 8.  
 
3. The Model 
 
We consider a simple one-period model of financing involving both adverse selection and 
effort moral hazard. There are two dates, 0 and 1, and one homogeneous (perishable) 
good which can be used either for consumption or investment purposes. There are also 
two groups of agents: entrepreneurs and financiers. Both groups of agents consume only 
at date 1. Each entrepreneur has an indivisible project but no initial wealth. All projects 
require the same fixed initial investment I, at date 0. Since the entrepreneurs have no 
initial wealth, they need to raise I from the market. Each financier has a very large 
amount of initial wealth and can lend at zero interest rate. For simplicity, we assume that 
there are just two financiers involved in Bertrand competition.   
     Both the entrepreneurs and the financiers are risk neutral. Also, there are no taxes, no 
bankruptcy or financial distress costs. Finally, there is no conflict of interest between 
managers and entrepreneurs. In fact, firms are run by entrepreneurs.                    
     Investment takes place at date 0. Returns are realized at date 1 and are observable and 
verifiable. There are two states of nature: Success, Failure. If a project succeeds it yields 
. In case of failure, all projects yield 0 regardless of the entrepreneur’s type. There are 
two types of entrepreneurs (projects), G (good) and B (bad), with respective proportions 
in the population 
iX
λ  and  λ−1 ,  10 ≤≤ λ .             
     The success probability of a project, denoted by )( iCπ , depends on the effort level 
that each entrepreneur chooses privately. There are two effort levels: Low (shirking), 
High (working). If an entrepreneur exerts effort ( CCi = ), he incurs a utility cost of C  
and his success probability )( iCπ  is Cπ . If he shirks ( 0=iC ), his utility cost is 0 but his 
success probability )( iCπ  is 0π , where 0ππ >C . Given identical effort levels, the 
success probability is the same for both types of projects but in case of success the good 
project’s return is higher:  and , BG XX > jBjGj πππ == 0,Cj = .11  
                                                 
11 This assumption is made because it simplifies the analysis without losing any insight. All main results go 
through under the more general assumption  (first-order stochastic dominance).  Bj
G
j ππ ≥
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     If the high effort level is chosen, the net present value (NPV) of both types of projects 
exceeds the cost of effort. In contrast, if shirking is chosen, neither project is 
economically viable (both types of projects have strictly negative NPV). That is, 
                          
Assumption 1:  IXCIX iiC −>>>− 00 ππ ,       BGi ,=  
 
     Assumption 1 also implies CX iC >− )( 0ππ , ( BGi ,= ). That is, the choice of the 
high effort level by either type leads to an increase in the net social surplus and so is 
socially efficient. 
     For expositional purposes, we begin by restricting the financing instruments available 
to entrepreneurs to debt and outside equity. Debt claims are zero-coupon bonds that are 
senior to equity. 
     A contract ),( DA α=  provides the entrepreneur with the required amount of funds, I, 
in return for a combination of debt of face value  and a proportion of equity of the 
project 
Dα ,  10 ≤≤α ,   . 0≥D
     Therefore, given risk neutrality and limited liability, the entrepreneurs seek to 
maximize: 
 
             [ ]0),)(1()(),,,( iiiiiiiii DXMaxCCDXU −−= απα ,12        BGi ,=                   (1) 
 
where  is the expected utility of an entrepreneur of type i when choosing the contract iU
),( iii DA α= .  
     At date 0, when the contract is signed, the entrepreneurs know their own type but the 
financiers cannot observe either the type of each individual entrepreneur or verify the 
actions (choice of effort level) of the entrepreneurs applying for funds. The financiers do, 
however, know the proportion of each type in the population of entrepreneurs and the 
nature of the investment and moral hazard “technology”. The financiers also wish to 
maximize their expected profit. The expected profit, , of an financier offering a 
contract 
FP
),( Dα , given limited liability, is given by: 
 
               [ ]{ } IDXMinDXMaxCP iiiF −+−= ),(0),()( απ ,        i BG,=                       (2) 
 
3.1 Effort Incentive Constraints 
 
Let us first consider the moral hazard problem an entrepreneur of type i faces. A given 
contract ),( Dα  will induce the high effort level if 
 
                            CDX iC ≥−−− ))(1)(( 0 αππ ,          BGi ,=                                       (3) 
 
                                                 
12 Whenever the Max or Min operators are irrelevant they will be suppresed. 
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         or    0))(1( ≥−−−=Δ cDX ii α ,     where   
0ππ −≡ C
Cc  ,    BGi ,=                 (3’) 
 
The left-hand side of (3) is the increase in the entrepreneur’s net expected return from 
exerting effort and the right-hand side is the cost of effort. Let  be the locus of 
combinations 
iICF
),( Dα  such that 0=Δ i . This locus divides the ),( Dα  space into two 
regions: On and below the  locus the entrepreneurs of type i exert effort (this is the 
set of effort incentive compatible contracts, ) and above it they do not. Because, in 
case of success, the return of the good project exceeds that of the bad one ( ), a 
given increase in the success probability leads to a greater increase in the net expected 
return of a good entrepreneur. As a result, good entrepreneurs can be more easily 
incentivized to exert effort.  That is, the G-type’s set of effort incentive compatible 
contracts is strictly greater than that of the B-type ( ). Lemma 1 summarizes 
the key features of the moral hazard “technology”. 
iICF
iIC
BG XX >
GB ICIC ⊂
 
Lemma 1.  In the ),( Dα  space: 
a)  are downward sloping and strictly concave. Also, at any iICF ),( Dα  pair,  is 
flatter than . 
GICF
BICF
b)  lies strictly below . That is, . BICF GICF GB ICIC ⊂
c) Neither  nor  is empty. BIC GIC
 
Proof:  See the Appendix (See also Figure 1). 
 
 
 
                                        α  
                
                                 
                           GXc−1                                     BICF
                              
                           BXc−1                                                           GICF
                                                                                                                       
 
                                                                   BIC GIC
 
                                        0  
                                                           cX B −                    cX G −                                                                    D
 
Figure 1. Effort incentive constraints. 
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3.2  Indifference Curves 
 
The family of indifference curves of type i can be derived from Eq. (1). It should be 
noted that the shape of the indifference curves is independent of the probability of 
success.13  As a result, no indifference curve of type i crosses  and therefore the 
indifference curves do not exhibit kinks in the 
iICF
),( Dα  space. For each type, one of the 
indifference curves coincides with the corresponding     .ICF
     
Lemma 2. Let  denote the family of indifference curves of type i, and  denote a 
member of this family. In the 
iU iu
),( Dα  space, for 10 <≤α  and iXD <≤0  
a)   are downward sloping and concave.  iu
b)  At any ),( Dα  pair,  is flatter than  and so the indifference curves of G- and B-
type cross only once. 
Gu Bu
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
     That is, the marginal rate of substitution of debt for equity of the G-type is greater than 
that of the B-type. Intuitively, equity is more valuable for the G-type whereas debt is 
equally valuable for both types.14 As a result, the G-type is willing to accept a greater 
increase in  in exchange for a given reduction in D α  than the B-type. Technically, the 
single-crossing condition is satisfied. Also, the closer to the origin an indifference curve, 
the higher the expected utility.     
                                                                                                                                                               
3.3  Zero-profit Curves  
 
The expected profit of a financier offering a contract ),( Dα  is given by Eq. (2). It is clear 
that the expected profit depends crucially on the effort level chosen (through the project 
success probability). So, if a zero-profit curve crosses the corresponding effort incentive 
frontier , it will exhibit a discontinuity because the success probability changes 
discontinuously when the entrepreneurs change their effort level. However, given limited 
liability and the assumption that both types of projects have negative NPV when the low 
effort level is chosen (
ICF
00 <− IX iπ ), the zero-profit curves corresponding to shirking 
( 0ππ = ) do not exist. Any contract ),( Dα  financing a shirking entrepreneur is loss-
making and no rational financier will offer it. Therefore, zero-profit curves can exist only 
if the high effort level is chosen (by at least one of the two types of entrepreneurs).  
     More specifically, the zero-profit curve corresponding to the i-type ( ) exists only if 
the i-type chooses the high effort level (his effort incentive constraint is satisfied) when 
he receives funds at fair terms.
iZP
15 In other words, the existence of a zero-profit curve 
                                                 
13 This is due to fact that in the event of failure the return is zero. 
14 The market value of debt depends only on the success probability (which is equal for both types) whereas 
the value of equity also depends on the return in case of success which greater for the G-type. 
 
15 By assumption 1, both types of projects have strictly positive NPV when the high effort level is chosen 
and negative NPV when the entrepreneurs opt for shirking.  
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( ) requires that it belong to the corresponding set of effort incentive compatible 
contracts ( ). Given the investment and moral hazard technology, if both types receive 
funds at fair terms three different cases may arise: i) the effort incentive constraint is not 
binding for either type, ii) it is not binding for the G-type but is violated for the B-type, 
and iii) it is violated for both types.
iZP
iIC
16 Conditional on the choice of the high effort level 
there exist three zero-profit curves: that corresponding to the G-type ( ), to the B-type 
( ), and the pooling zero-profit curve ( ).
GZP
BZP HPZP
17 Lemma 3 summarizes the key 
properties of the zero-profit curves and their relationship with the corresponding 
indifference curves and effort incentive frontiers. Subsequently, Lemma 4 provides the 
conditions for the existence of the individual zero-profit curves  and . GZP BZP
 
Lemma 3. In the ),( Dα  space, 
a) All  ,  are downward sloping and strictly concave.  iZP HPZP
b)  and  intersect at GZP BZP 0=α . For 0>α ,  lies entirely below . GZP BZP
c) , , and  never cross each other, iICF iu iZP BGi ,= . 
                                                                                                                                         
Proof:  See the Appendix.          
 
Intuitively, in Part (b), since both have the same success probability, given its face value, 
the debt issued by both types is equally valuable. Thus, if both issue only debt, zero profit 
for financiers requires the issue of the same level of debt. However, if equity is also 
issued, since the G-type equity is more valuable, a financier who just breaks even would 
ask for a lower proportion of equity if he offered funds to the G-type than to the B-type 
(given the debt level). That is,  lies below  at any positive level of equity issued.  GZP BZP
     Also, since all three, zero-profit curves, indifference curves, and effort incentive 
frontiers corresponding to type i have the same slope, they never cross. One of the 
indifference curves coincides with the corresponding zero-profit curve. However, the 
location of the zero-profit curve relative to the corresponding effort incentive frontier is 
the key determinant for the existence of the former.                                                                                            
 
Lemma 4. Suppose both types obtain funds at fair terms, then                                        
 
a) If cIX CiC ππ ≥− , , then both  and  exist.  BGi ,= GZP BZP
b) If cIX CGC ππ ≥− , cIX CBC ππ <− , then only  exists. GZP
c) If cIX CiC ππ <− , , then neither  nor  exists. BGi ,= GZP BZP
            
    α                                                                  α    
                                                 
16 Part (b) of Lemma 1 implies that if the effort incentive constraint for the G-type is violated, then it is also 
violated for the B-type (but not necessarily vice versa). 
17 There can also exist another pooling zero-profit curve corresponding to the case in which one type opts 
for the high effort level and the other shirks ( ).    LPZP
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                                                                                                                                         BZP GZP
 BC XI π                                                        GXc−1                                                                     
                                                              
 BXc−1                                           BICF GC XI π                                     
                                                                                                                   GIC
                                                                                                                                                     BIC GICF
                                                                                     
             
            0                  cX B − CI π                           0                 D CI π            cX G − D
                        
                        Panel A: B-Type                                              Panel B: G-Type  
 
Figure 2. Effort incentive constraints and zero-profit curves.               
 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
 
Case (a) corresponds to pure adverse selection. Although moral hazard is present, 
because for both types the NPV ( IX iC −π ) exceeds the “effective” cost of effort ( cCπ ), 
it has no bite. If either type obtains funds at fair terms, he exerts effort and so the 
corresponding zero-profit curve exists. In Case (b), financing at fair terms implies that the 
effort incentive constraint of the G-type is satisfied but that of the B-type is violated (  
belongs to  but  lies outside ). As a result, the G-type exerts effort and so 
 exists whereas the B-type opts for shirking and  does not exist. In Case (c), the 
NPV of the project falls short of the “effective” cost of effort for both types. Thus, both 
types opt for shirking and so no zero-profit curve exists. Figure 2 provides an illustration 
for Case (b).    
GZP
GIC BZP BIC
GZP BZP
           
3.4  Equilibrium 
 
It is well-known that, in most cases, the equilibrium outcome in competitive markets with 
asymmetric information depends crucially on the game-theoretic specification of the 
strategic interaction between the informed and uninformed agents. Here, I assume that the 
financiers and the entrepreneurs play the following three-stage game due to Hellwig 
(1987): 
 
Stage 1: The two financiers simultaneously offer contracts ),( Dα . Each financier may 
offer any finite number of contracts.  
 
Stage 2: Given the offers made by the financiers, the entrepreneurs apply for (at most) 
one contract from one financier. If an entrepreneur’s most preferred contract is offered by 
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both financiers, the entrepreneur chooses each financier’s offer with probability 21 . In 
the light of the contract chosen, the entrepreneur decides whether to work or shirk.  
 
Stage 3: After observing the contracts offered by his rival and those chosen by the 
entrepreneurs, each financier decides which applications will accept or reject. If an 
application is rejected, the applicant does not receive funds.     
 
This game structure rationalizes a Wilson equilibrium (1977) as a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium.18 Unlike the two-stage screening game, it allows for the existence of a 
(interior) Nash pooling equilibrium when this pooling equilibrium Pareto-dominates any 
other equilibrium.19  
     We only consider pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. A pair of contracts 
( ) is an equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied (in a pooling 
equilibrium ):
BG AA ,
AAA BG == 20
 
• No contract in the equilibrium pair implies negative (expected) profits for the 
financier. In other words, the financiers’ participation or IR constraints are satisfied:  
 
                   [ ]{ } IDXMinDXMaxC iii ≥+− ),(0),()( απ ,       i BG,=                             (4) 
 
• Profit maximization: No other set of contracts, if offered alongside the equilibrium 
pair at Stage 1, would increase a financier’s expected profit. 
   
 
4. Types of Equilibria and Provision of Funds: General Results 
 
Because of Bertrand competition, any equilibrium involves zero expected profits for the 
financiers. This implies that any equilibrium contract must lie on one of the zero-profit 
curves. This, in turn, implies the following result: 
 
Lemma 5.  A separating equilibrium can exist only if both  and  exist. If either 
 or  or both do not exist, then no separating equilibrium exists.
GZP BZP
BZP GZP
21
                                                 
18 This game is not unique in that respect. Many other games can be used to provide game-theoretic 
foundations to Wilson equilibrium. For example, if we swap stages 2 and 3 of the above game we can 
support the same pooling allocation as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The key for the 
implementation of this pooling allocation as a Nash equilibrium is that the commitment of the financiers to 
the contracts they offer is endogenous rather than exogenously imposed as in Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976). I employ this particular game because the focus of the paper is not on the implementation of 
incentive efficient allocations and the use of a well-known game facilitates the exposition. 
19 As shown by Diasakos and Koufopoulos (2008), if agents are allowed to choose the mechanism used for 
the allocation of resources, any equilibrium mechanism will implement the interim incentive efficient 
allocation that maximizes the expected utility of the highest-quality type. Also, there potentially exist many 
(infinite) mechanisms that can achieve the same outcome. In this paper, this allocation coincides with the 
pooling allocation which is the unique “reasonable” equilibrium of the three-stage used.  
20 We assume that if an entrepreneur is indifferent between investing and not he invests. Given that 
assumption and limited liability, the entrepreneurs’ participation constraints are always satisfied. 
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Proof: First, given limited liability, if funds are offered (whatever the terms they are 
offered at) both types of entrepreneurs will always accept them and undertake their 
project. Thus, there cannot exist a separating equilibrium where only one type invests. 
Suppose now there is a separating equilibrium in which the G-type chooses contract 
),( GG Dα  and the B-type chooses contract ),( BB Dα . The contract chosen by the G-type 
must lie on the G-zero-profit line ( ) and that chosen by the B-type on the B-zero-
profit line ( ). Therefore, a separating equilibrium can exist only if both zero-profit 
curves exist. If one (or both) of the zero-profit curves does not exist, a separating 
equilibrium cannot exist.   Q.E.D.  
GZP
BZP
 
 
    Lemma 5 implies that in cases where one (or both) of the zero-profit curves does not 
exist, if there exists an equilibrium, it must be pooling. Proposition 1 summarizes these 
results. 
 
Proposition 1. A separating equilibrium can exist only if cIX CiC ππ ≥− , . If BGi ,=
cIX CiC ππ <− , for either , or Bi = BGi ,= , then the resulting equilibria must be 
pooling.    
 
The next general result concerns the conditions under which funds are provided.  
 
Proposition 2. 
a) If cIX CiC ππ ≥− , , then both types of projects receive financing.  BGi ,=
b) If cIX CGC ππ ≥− , cIX CBC ππ <− , then funds are offered to both types only if (a 
part of) either  or  exists. HPZP LPZP
c) If cIX CiC ππ <− , , there exists a unique pooling equilibrium where no 
entrepreneur obtains funds (no project is undertaken).  
BGi ,=
 
Proof: In any equilibrium, funds are offered only along the zero-profit curves. Thus, in 
any equilibrium, the financiers will offer funds only if (a part of) a zero-profit curve 
exists.  
a) By Lemma 4, both  and  exist. As a result,  also exists. Hence, 
regardless of the type of the equilibrium (separating or pooling) funds are offered. 
GZP BZP HPZP
b) By Lemma 5, in this case, only pooling equilibria can exist. However, the existence 
of pooling equilibria where funds are offered requires that (a part of) a pooling zero-
profit curve exists. Thus, (a part of) either  or  must exist.HPZP LPZP
22  
                                                                                                                                                 
21 Given that the entrepreneurs’ participation constraints are always satisfied, the result in Lemma 5 holds 
true regardless of the form of the contracts.  
22  (A part of)  exists if it belongs to the intersection of  and . Contracts offered along it are 
effort incentive compatible for both types. Thus, both types choose the high effort level and so it actually 
exists. If  does not belong to the intersection of IC  and , it does not exist. In such a case, (at 
least) one of the two types shirks contradicting the condition on which  is drawn. (A part of)  
HPZP BIC GIC
HPZP B GIC
HPZP LPZP
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c) By Lemma 4, neither  nor  exists. As a result, by Lemma 5, no separating 
equilibrium exists. Moreover, since neither  nor  exists, no pooling zero-
profit curve exists. If a financier offers funds to any entrepreneur, he will make 
losses. Therefore, no rational financier will do so (the financiers’ participation 
constraints are violated).   Q.E.D.  
GZP BZP
GZP BZP
 
Notice that even in Case (c), if either type had chosen the high effort level he would have 
enjoyed a strictly positive expected utility (the difference between the NPV of the project 
and the cost of effort) instead of zero. However, due to moral hazard, the inducement of 
this choice is not feasible. 
 
 
5. Types of Equilibria and Methods of Financing: Specific Results 
 
     Now that we have developed the analytical apparatus, we can go on to prove our main 
results. Subsection 5.1 examines the pure adverse selection case. In subsection 5.2 we 
consider the case where adverse selection and moral hazard interact. 
  
5.1  The Pure Adverse Selection Case 
 
It would be useful, as a benchmark, to first consider the pure adverse selection case (Case 
(a) of Lemma 4). In this case, as we have seen, no effort incentive constraint is binding if 
funds are offered at fair terms and so both zero-profit curves  and  exist. This, in 
turn, implies that the pooling zero-profit curve  also exists. Therefore, both 
separating and pooling equilibria can exist. More specifically, 
GZP BZP
HPZP
 
Proposition 3. If cIX CiC ππ ≥− , BGi ,= , there exists a pooling equilibrium where 
both types issue only debt as well as a continuum of separating equilibria where the G-
type issues only debt whereas the B-type issues a combination of debt and equity. In any 
equilibrium, the securities issued are fairly priced (See Figure A1).  
 
Proof: See the Appendix  
 
Under pure adverse selection, debt and equity are only used to convey information about 
the type of the project. Because equity issued by the G-type is more valuable whereas 
debt issued by both types is equally valuable, if the G-type issues some equity the B-type 
will mimic him and so in the resulting pooling equilibrium the G-type will subsidize the 
B-type through the mispricing of equity. Hence, in any pooling equilibrium where some 
equity is issued, the G-type has an incentive to deviate by issuing more debt. By doing so, 
he can credibly signal his type, reduce the cross-subsidization and increase his expected 
                                                                                                                                                 
GIC
IXX BGC ≥−+ 0)1(
exists if the following two conditions are satisfied: i) (A part of) it belongs to either  and ii) 
λ πλπ .   
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return (utility). As a result, no pooling equilibrium where some equity is issued can 
sustain. That is, the G-type issues just debt to avoid selling an underpriced security 
(equity). Given that, the B-type is indifferent between issuing just debt and any fairly 
priced combination of debt and equity. Therefore, the issue of equity signals a B-type.  
 
5.2  The Adverse Selection cum Moral Hazard Case  
 
In this subsection, we examine the case where the B-type NPV falls short of his 
“effective” cost of effort (Case (b) of Lemma 4). That is, if the B-type is offered funds at 
fair terms, his effort incentive constraint is violated and so the corresponding zero-profit 
curve does not exist. Thus, only pooling equilibria can exist. Because the choice of the 
high effort level is socially efficient, here we focus on pooling equilibria where both 
types exert effort. These equilibria involve cross-subsidization across types and Pareto-
dominate any other equilibrium. Through the mispricing of equity at individual level, the 
B-type receives the subsidy necessary to induce him to work.      
     That is, in the presence of both adverse selection and (effort) moral hazard, in addition 
to conveying information, debt and equity play a second role. That of incentivizing the 
more prone to shirking type. This double role stems from the interaction between adverse 
selection and moral hazard and provides an explanation for the issue of combinations of 
debt and equity even if the issue of equity implies an adverse selection cost. What is 
more, in contrast with the pure adverse selection case, the cross-subsidization is socially 
beneficial. It converts negative into positive NPV projects and improves social welfare.  
      
Proposition 4. Suppose that cIX CGC ππ >− , cIX CBC ππ <−  and  
BGC XcXI −< 1π . Then if 1λλ >  there exists a unique pooling (funding) equilibrium 
where both types choose the socially efficient high effort level and obtain funds by 
issuing a combination of debt and equity (See Figure 3).  
 
where 
)1)((
)(
1
BBGC
BC
XcXX
cXI
−−
−−≡ π
πλ   
 
The equilibrium contract, , lies at the intersection of  and  with 
 and 
),( ∗∗= DA α BICF HPZP
∗α ∗D  given by: 
 
                                                
( )
)( BGC
BC
XX
cXI
−
−−=∗ λπ
πα                                                        (5) 
 
                                                )1( ∗∗ −−= αcXD B                                                         (6) 
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Proof: We test whether the contract at A  is an equilibrium by considering deviations.23 
Offers below  are clearly loss-making. Any offer in the area between  (the G-type 
indifference curve through the equilibrium contract) and  to the left of  is going 
to be taken by both types and so is unprofitable. Thus, we only need to consider the 
following two deviations: i) Suppose that a financier deviates by offering a contract, say 
GZP
A
Gu
GZP BICF
A′ , in the area between  and  to the right of . Given that contract AGu GZP BICF A  is still 
offered, the deviant contract, contract A′ , will reasonably attract only the G-type. This, in 
turn, implies that contract A is taken only by the B-type and so it becomes loss-making. 
As a result, at Stage 3, any application for that contract will be rejected. Anticipating that, 
the B-type will also choose A′ , at Stage 2, and hence A′  becomes also loss-making 
(since to the right of ,  does not exist, and  lies to the right of ). 
Therefore, there is no profitable deviation to the right of 
BICF HPZP LPZP
A
Gu
A . ii) Consider now a financier 
who deviates by offering a contract, say A ′′ , in the area between  and  to the left 
of  (above) 
BICF
A
Gu
A . Given that contract A  is still offered, contract A ′′  will reasonably attract 
only the B-type and so is loss-making. Thus, any application for contract A ′′  will be 
rejected at stage 3. Actually, anticipating the rejection of that application at Stage 3, no 
B-type would make it at Stage 2. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium at A  is the unique 
equilibrium where funds are provided.24   Q.E.D.   
 
 
 
 
                                    α  
             
 
                                                                                           
                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 •      
                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                                                   
           
                                                                                  
                                                                                            AGu
                                                                            • A′  
                                                          GZP
                                        
                                                 
23 In the Appendix, we also provide mathematical proofs for our results.  
 
24 It should be noted that uniqueness follows from the application of the “intuitive criterion”. All contracts 
along (the relevant part of)  correspond to pooling perfect Bayesian equilibria under abritrary out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. However, contract A is the only one that survives the “intuitive criterion” (Cho and 
Kreps, 1987).  
HPZP
•  A ′′ H
PZP  
BICF  
LPZP  
A
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Figure 3. Pooling equilibrium where both debt and (mispriced) equity are issued. 
 
 
The pooling equilibrium at A  reflects a trade-off between information revelation and 
effort incentives. The securities issued by the G- and B-type are priced as a pool. 
Although, because of perfect competition, debt and equity are fairly priced collectively, 
at individual level equity issued by the G-type is underpriced and that issued by the B-
type overpriced. Not surprisingly, it is precisely this mispricing that provides the B-type 
with the subsidy necessary to induce him to exert effort. Hence, given that the single-
crossing condition is satisfied, the G-type has an incentive to deviate by choosing a 
contract involving more debt and less equity than the equilibrium contract. By doing so, 
he can credibly signal his type, reduce the cross-subsidization and increase his expected 
return.  
     However, his attempt will be fruitless. If the G-type chooses such a contract, the 
equilibrium contract becomes loss-making for the financiers and so any application for 
that will be rejected. As a result, the B-type will always mimic the G-type preventing him 
from revealing his type and obtaining funds in better terms. What is more, the deviant 
contract gives the B-type less subsidy and so destroys his effort incentives. The B-type 
shirks and the collective expected return falls significantly. A financier who offers a 
contract involving less equity than the equilibrium contract can break even only if he asks 
for a considerably greater face value of debt (higher interest rate on debt). But neither 
type prefers such a deviant contract to the equilibrium contract. Hence, no financier has 
an incentive to offer a contract involving less equity than the equilibrium contract and so 
the G-type stays in equilibrium and provides the B-type with just enough subsidy in order 
to induce him to work. 
     Loosely speaking, the G-type accepts to issue some equity and induce the B-type to 
exert effort because the increase in his net expected return (due to the lower interest rate 
he pays on debt) more than offsets the cost of the incremental subsidy (the adverse 
selection cost of issuing equity). That is, the G-type is better off in the pooling 
equilibrium of Proposition 4 where both debt and equity are issued and both types exert 
effort than in a pooling equilibrium where only debt is issued and so the B-type shirks 
(point M in Figure 3).25  
     Moreover, the role of debt and equity as communication devices implies that no 
financier can make a profit by offering a contract involving more equity (subsidy) and 
less debt than the equilibrium contract. Given that the equilibrium contract is still offered, 
the deviant contract will not be taken by any entrepreneur at Stage 2. If an entrepreneur 
chooses this contract, the financier will infer that he is a B-type. As a result, the deviant 
contract is loss-making and any application for that will be rejected at Stage 3. 
Anticipating that, no entrepreneur will apply for it at Stage 2.        
                                                 
25 Notice that in the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 the G-type is worse off compared to the case 
where types are observable and he obtains funds at fair terms. However, social welfare exceeds that under 
full information about types (see also the discussion in Subsection 5.2.2).  
 17
     That is, the existence of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium relies on two 
factors: i) the endogenous (discrete)26 choice of the effort level and ii) the three-stage 
game structure that allows for an (interior) pooling perfect-Bayesian equilibrium even if 
cross-subsidization across types takes place and the single-crossing condition is met.27 
Due to the presence of the third stage agents behave less myopically than in a two-stage 
screening game and so the non-existence problem is resolved.  
     If it exists, the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 has several interesting 
implications: First, it provides an explanation of why good firms issue both debt and 
underpriced equity even though the bankruptcy and other agency costs associated with 
debt are zero. Second, in contrast with the pure adverse selection case, the cross-
subsidization is socially beneficial. It converts a negative into a positive NPV project and 
improves social welfare. Third, it has implications for empirical testing.  
 
5.2.1. Implications for the Issue of Securities 
 
     To fix ideas, let us compare the adverse selection cum moral hazard case with the pure 
adverse selection and pure moral hazard cases. Under pure adverse selection, the 
securities issued are only used to convey socially costless information about the type of 
the project. Therefore, firms issue combinations of debt and equity only if both securities 
are fairly priced not only collectively but also individually. Pooling equilibria involving 
cross-subsidization can exist only if the less valuable for the subsidizer security (debt) is 
issued (corner solution). In this case, there is no channel through which the cross-subsidy 
can have positive effects for the subsidizer. As a result, the subsidizer maximizes his 
return by minimizing the subsidy he provides the other type.  
     In contrast, in the presence of effort moral hazard, if the subsidizer cannot reveal his 
type, it may be in his interest to incur the adverse selection cost of issuing some of the 
more valuable for him security. By doing so, he provides the more prone to shirking type 
with the subsidy necessary to induce him to work and so the collective expected return 
rises. If the resulting increase in his expected return exceeds this adverse selection cost, 
the subsidizer’s welfare improves. For example, in Proposition 4 the benefit (due to the 
lower interest rate he pays on debt) for the G-type from accepting to issue some equity 
and inducing the B-type to exert effort exceeds the underpricing of his equity (the adverse 
selection cost associated with the equity issue).28
                                                 
26 We conjecture that, under certain restrictions on the probability and cost functions, this pooling 
equilibrium exists even if the effort level is a continuous variable.  
27 In a two-stage signalling game, such a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. Behaving myopically, the G-
type tries to reveal his type by issuing more debt and less equity. However, the B-type always mimics and, 
more importantly, his effort incentives are destroyed. Therefore, there can exist either pooling equilibria 
where only debt is issued (corner solution) and the G-type works whereas the B-type shirks or pooling 
equilibria where both types shirk and so no funds are provided. In either case, the resulting pooling 
equilibria are Pareto-inferior to that of Proposition 4.  
28 Notice that, although the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 involves cross-subsidization across types 
of entrepreneurs, it does not involve cross-subsidization across debt and equity. Once the equilibrium is 
determined, the value of these two contracts can be calculated independently and so debt and equity could 
be traded separately in a secondary market. In fact, the same equilibrium obtains even if instead of one 
financier offering both debt and equity, the financiers specialize in one of the two contracts and debt and 
equity markets are perfectly competitive (see Appendix for a proof).  
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     In the pure moral hazard case, the financiers observe the type of each individual 
entrepreneur. As a result, each type is offered contracts along the corresponding zero-
profit curve, provided it exists. In the context of our simple model, the mode of financing 
is irrelevant.29 All combinations of debt and equity along the existing zero-profit curve 
are offered and are equally preferred by the corresponding type.     
  
5.2.2. Implications for Investment and Social Welfare 
  
Under the conditions in Proposition 4, if types were observable only the G-type would 
receive financing. If the B-type receives funds at fair terms he shirks and so his project 
NPV is negative. Moreover, financiers have no incentive to transfer resources from the 
G-type to the B-type to induce the latter to exert effort. Thus, no rational financier would 
be willing to offer the B-type the required for the investment funds and so the B-type 
project would not be undertaken. That is, under full information about types a potentially 
positive NPV investment opportunity is forgone. Furthermore, because when the B-type 
works his project NPV exceeds the cost of effort, the social welfare also worsens.  
     These results are in sharp contrast with the pure adverse selection case. In Myers and 
Majluf (1984) adverse selection leads firms to forego positive NPV projects whereas in 
de Meza and Webb (1987) it encourages firms to undertake negative NPV projects. 
Hence, in either case social welfare is lower than under full information about types. The 
key to this difference is that in the presence of (effort) moral hazard the cross-
subsidization taking place in a pooling equilibrium relaxes this additional constraint and 
so it can be beneficial.  In contrast, given risk neutrality, under pure adverse selection 
there is no channel through which the cross-subsidy can have positive effects but it may 
have negative consequences.  
 
5.2.3. Empirical Implications 
 
     This pooling equilibrium also has implications for empirical testing: i) From Eq. (5) it 
is clear that the higher the proportion of low-profitability firms (the lower λ ), the higher 
(lower) the fraction of funds raised through equity (debt). Intuitively, as the proportion of 
the G-type falls, the fraction of equity needed to provide the B-type with the subsidy 
necessary to induce him to work increases. This prediction is consistent with the findings 
in Fama and French (2005). ii) Because debt issued by both types is equally valuable 
while the G-type equity is more valuable, ex post, good firms have lower debt-equity 
ratios (market values). This negative relation between leverage and profitability has been 
documented by several empirical studies (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002)).  
 
 
6. The Role of Warrants 
  
                                                 
29 This result is due to the assumption that in case of failure the project yields zero regardless of its type. If 
instead we assume that in case of failure the return is strictly positive then debt becomes the optimal 
contract (Innes (1990)). All the main results go through under the latter assumption. However, the zero-
return assumption simplifies considerably the analysis without losing any insight. 
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So far, the available financial instruments have been debt and equity. The discussion of 
the previous section illustrated the roles of these two financial contracts as separation 
devices and means of incentivizing the more prone to shirking type. In this section, we 
introduce financing instruments with option features. More specifically, the entrepreneurs 
can borrow the required amount I by issuing a debt-warrant combination.  
     The warrant gives its holder the right to purchase a prespecified proportion of the 
firm’s equity, η , at an agreed price K (exercise price). The proceeds from the exercise of 
the option, K, are distributed as dividends to the shareholders. Therefore, a warrant 
holder will exercise if  
 
                              iiiii KKDX ≥+− )(η ,    ,    0≥iK BGi ,=                                      (7) 
 
This can be rewritten as 
 
                                       )(
1 iii
i
i DXK −−≤ η
η
,      BGi ,=                                            (7’) 
 
So, given risk neutrality and limited liability, the entrepreneurs seek to maximize: 
 
       [ ]{ }0),(),)(1()(),,,,( iiiiiiiiiiiii DXMaxKDXMinCKCDXU −+−−= ηπη            (8) 
 
where  is the expected utility of an entrepreneur of type i when choosing the contract iU
),,( iiii KDη=Ξ . Similarly, given limited liability, the expected profit of a financier 
offering the contract ),,( iiii KDη=Ξ  is given by:  
 
                  { } IDXMinDKKDXMaxCP iiiiiiiiiF −+−+−= ),(,)()( ηπ                       (9) 
 
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that the exercise price is set such that, in 
case of success, the option is exercised regardless of the type of the project. That is, the 
exercise price is given by: 
 
               ))(1(
1 iBii
i
i DXK −−−= ψη
η
   where [ ]1,0∈iψ ,         BGi ,=                       (10) 
 
Eq. (10) is a sufficient condition for the warrants issued by both types to be exercised in 
case of success.30 Furthermore, without loss of generality, we assume [ 1,0∈== ]ψψψ BG .31 Basically, this assumption reduces the choice variables from three 
                                                 
30 This condition is imposed for simplicity. All results go through if instead of  in Eq. (10) we had  
or even if we specified a different function for the exercise of the warrant issued by each type. However, 
these modifications would complicate the analysis without adding any insight.  
BX GX
31 A combination of debt and equity is a special case of a debt-warrant combination that obtains for 
1== BG ψψ . 
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),,( KDη  to two ),( Dη . The choice of η  and  completely determines D K . By doing so, 
we considerably simplify the analysis without losing any insight.32 Using Eq. (10) and 
the assumption about ψ , the utility and profit functions simplify respectively to: 
 
            [ ]))(1())(1()(),,,,( iBiiiiiiiiiii DXDXCKCDXU −−+−−= ψηηπη               (11) 
 
                      [{ } IDDXDXCP iiBiiiiF ] −+−−−−= ))(1()()( ψηπ                             (12) 
 
 
6.1. Indifference Curves and Effort Incentive Constraints  
 
A given contract ),( Dη  will induce the high effort level if 
 
                                              cKDX i ≥+−− ))(1( η                                                     (13) 
 
So, the equations of the effort incentive frontiers  and  are given respectively 
by: 
BICF GICF
                                              cDX B =−− ))(1( ψη                                                         (14) 
 
                               cXXDX BGG =−−−−− ))(1())(1( ψηψη                                     (15) 
 
The family of indifference curves of type i can be derived from Eq. (11). The indifference 
curves have the same slope as the corresponding effort incentive frontiers. As a result, no 
indifference curve of type i crosses  and therefore the indifference curves do not 
exhibit kinks in the 
iICF
),( Dη  space. One of the indifference curves coincides with the 
corresponding .ICF         
 
 
Lemma 6. In the ),( Dη  space: 
 
a)  and  are downward sloping and strictly concave.  At any GICF BICF ),( Dη  pair, 
 is flatter than . GICF BICF
b) For any BXc−≤1ψ ,  and  intersect at some GICF BICF )0,1( ≥= Dη . 
c) The indifference curves of the G- and B-type have the same slope as the 
corresponding effort incentive frontiers. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
 
                                                 
32 No more than two choice variables are necessary for our purposes. Clearly, all the results go through if 
we increase their number to three by allowing for BG ψψ ≠ .  
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Notice that now  and  can intersect at admissible values of the choice 
variables 
GICF BICF
),( Dη  although when the financial instruments available are debt and equity 
 lies entirely below . Intuitively, since , at any given BICF GICF BG XX > ),( Dη  pair, a 
given fall in ψ  (increase in the exercise price) implies that the project’s return constitutes 
a smaller proportion of the total payment to the warrantholder if the warrant is issued by 
the B-type. That is, as the exercise price rises, the warrant value falls proportionately 
faster for the B-type and so the B-type is willing to increase faster the proportion of 
equity, η , offered to the financier than the G-type while still exerting effort.33 As a result, 
for ψ  sufficiently low ( BXc−≤ 1ψ ),  and  intersect at some positive face 
value of debt, , even if this is not possible when we restrict ourselves to debt and 
equity or convertible debt.
GICF BICF
D
34         
                                                                                                                                                                              
6.2. Zero-profit Curves  
 
The expected profit of a financier offering a contract ),( Dη  is given by Eq. (12). Given 
Assumption 1, the zero-profit curve corresponding to the i-type ( ) exists only if the i-
type exerts effort when he receives funds at fair terms.
iZP
35 Conditional on the choice of the 
high effort level there exist three zero-profit curves: that corresponding to the G-type 
( ), to the B-type ( ), and the pooling zero-profit curve ( ). The equations of 
the zero-profit curves  and  are respectively: 
GZP BZP HPZP
BZP GZP
 
                                              [ IDDX BC ] =+− )(ηψπ                                                  (16) 
 
                                   [{ IDXXDX BGBC ] }=+−+− )()(ψηπ                                      (17) 
 
The key properties of the zero-profit curves and their relationship with the corresponding 
indifference curves and effort incentive frontiers are similar to those under debt and 
equity (see Lemma 3). Since , given the effort level, the warrants issued by the 
G-type are more valuable than those of the B-type whereas debt issued by both types is 
equally valuable. As a result, in the pure adverse selection case the equilibrium is also 
similar to that prevailing when the financing instruments are debt and equity. That is, the 
G-type always issues debt whereas the B-type issues either just debt or any combination 
of debt and warrants.  
BG XX >
     However, because the introduction of warrants affects asymmetrically the effort 
incentive constraints of the two types, their use will have significant effects on the 
equilibrium that obtains when adverse selection and moral hazard interact. 
                                                 
33 Diagrammatically, in the ),( Dη  space, as ψ  falls  becomes steeper faster than . BICF GICF
34 Details about the case of convertible debt are available from the author upon request. For an intuitive 
explanation of why, in our model, convertible debt does not improve on a debt-equity combination see 
Footnote 6.  
35 By Assumption 1, the NPV of both types of projects is strictly positive if the high effort level is chosen 
whereas it is strictly negative if shirking is chosen.  
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6.3. The Adverse Selection cum Moral Hazard Case  
 
In this subsection, we show that a debt-warrant combination allows for the existence of 
the socially efficient pooling equilibrium under weaker restrictions on parameter values 
than a debt-equity combination.  
 
Proposition 5. Suppose cIX CGC ππ >− , cIX CBC ππ <− . Then for any BXc−≤1ψ  
and 2λλ ≥  , then there exists a unique pooling (funding) equilibrium where both types 
exert effort and obtain funds by issuing a debt-warrant combination (see Panel B in 
Figure 4). 
 
where    12 )(
)( λπ
πλ <−
−−≡
BGC
BC
XX
cXI
 
 
The equilibrium contract, , lies at the intersection of  and  with 
 and 
),( ∗∗= DA η BICF HPZP
∗η ∗D  given by: 
 
                                                   
( )
)( BGC
BC
XX
cXI
−
−−=∗ λπ
πη                                                   (18)                
               
                                               ∗∗∗ <−−= KcXD B )1( ψη                                            (19)     
                                                    
Proof: Similar to Proposition 4 (see the Appendix).      
 
To illustrate the role of warrants, we graphically compare the case where the firms can 
issue a debt-equity combination with the case they issue a debt-warrant combination (see 
Panels A and B in Figure 4). By Lemma 1, if firms can only issue debt and equity, under 
this distributional assumption,  lies entirely below  (see also Figure 1). Also, 
because the G-type equity is more valuable, as his proportion in the population of 
entrepreneurs, 
BICF GICF
λ , decreases the pooling zero-profit curve  becomes steeper and 
intersects  at points corresponding to a higher proportion of equity. A necessary 
condition for the existence of the efficient pooling equilibrium is that  both 
intersects  and lies below  (  is constructed conditional on both types 
exerting effort). If 
HPZP
BICF
HPZP
BICF GICF HPZP
λ  falls below 1λ ,  lies entirely above  and so it is not 
relevant (see Panel A in Figure 4). As a result, the socially efficient pooling equilibrium 
collapses although the G-type would exert effort even if a higher proportion of equity was 
issued. 
HPZP BICF
    Because the warrant value falls with the exercise price proportionately faster for the B-
type, as the warrant exercise price rises both  and  become steeper but  
becomes so at a higher rate. As a result, for a sufficiently high exercise price,  and 
BICF HPZP BICF
BICF
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HPZP  meet again and the existence of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium is 
restored (see Panel B in Figure 4). That is, a debt-warrant combination allows for the 
existence of the efficient pooling equilibrium even if it collapses when firms can issue 
only debt and equity (and/or convertible debt).  
     Intuitively, in this case, if firms can only issue debt and equity, at any given debt level, 
the proportion of equity issued consistent with exerting effort is strictly lower for the B-
type. That is, the pooling equilibrium where both types exert effort may collapse although 
the G-type would have exerted effort even if a higher proportion of equity was issued 
(more subsidy was given to the B-type). In absolute terms, the value of warrants issued 
by either type falls with the exercise price by the same amount.36 However, because in 
case of success , the warrant value falls with the exercise price 
(proportionately) faster for the B-type. As a result, the B-type is willing to increase the 
proportion of equity offered to the financier faster than the G-type while still exerting 
effort. That is, the warrant payoff function between  and  can be steeper than the 
equity payoff function without violating the B-type effort incentive constraint.  
BG XX >
GX BX
     This implies that the difference between the total value of the warrants issued by the 
G- and B-type can exceed the corresponding difference of equity values consistent with 
both types working. This larger difference allows for the provision of the subsidy 
necessary to induce the B-type to work when the proportion of the G-type is so low that 
the socially efficient pooling equilibrium breaks if a debt-equity combination is used.  
 
 
 
    α                                                               η  
                                                                                         BICF
                                                                                                                              BICF GICF HPZP
                                                                                                     A                                                                                                                                                         
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        •              
                                                                                                         HPZP GICF
                                                                         
                                                               
                                                                              GZP
                                                                      GZP
                                                            
      0                                                                                                                 D 0 D
                   Panel A: Debt-Equity                                        Panel B: Debt-Warrant 
                                                             
Figure 4. The role of warrants. 
 
                                                 
36 That is, in absolute terms, the difference in the value of the warrants issued by the G-type and the B-type 
(regardless of the exercise price) is the same as the difference in the value of equity issued by the two types 
(given the face value of debt). 
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     The mechanism at work here relies on the fact that the warrant exercise price can be 
greater than the face value of debt. Given the face value of debt, by choosing a 
sufficiently high exercise price, we can create a security with a sufficiently steep payoff 
function which exploits the difference between the returns of the two types of projects 
and satisfies the B-type’s effort incentive constraint under weaker conditions than if 
warrants were not available. In other words, through the appropriate choice of their 
exercise price, warrants allow for the implementation of the socially efficient outcome 
even if this is not possible when we restrict ourselves to debt, equity and/or convertible 
debt.37 This mechanism provides a rationale for their use.         
 
7. Optimal Financial Contracts under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
 
If both the type and the actions of the entrepreneurs were observable (and verifiable), 
both types would exert effort if they were offered funds at fair terms. As a result, the net 
social surplus (social welfare) would be maximized (first best). However, if the choice of 
the effort level is not observable and one of the two types (the B-type) shirks if he 
receives funds at fair terms, the implementation of the socially efficient outcome requires 
cross-subsidization across types. In this section, we address the following question: Can 
competitive financial markets implement the socially efficient outcome under the same 
conditions as a benevolent central authority (social planner) who aims at maximizing 
social welfare?  
     Competitive financiers have no incentive to transfer resources from the G-type to the 
B-type to induce the latter to exert effort. Therefore, if types are observable or can be 
credibly revealed, they offer funds only to the G-type and so competitive markets cannot 
maximize social welfare. In a competitive environment, the implementation of the 
socially efficient outcome can be achieved only in a pooling equilibrium where the 
required cross-subsidization takes place through the mispricing of the G-type’s more 
valuable security (equity). We begin by characterizing the social planner’s solution (the 
optimal contract) under adverse selection and effort moral hazard.  
 
 
7.1. The Social Planner’s Solution: The Optimal Contract 
 
The social planner’s objective is to induce both types to exert effort whenever feasible. 
Hence, the social planner will offer the B-type the required subsidy even if he can 
distinguish the two types, provided the G-type effort incentive constraint is not violated. 
Since the returns of the two types in case of success are different, observable and 
verifiable, the social planner can ex post distinguish the two types and promise to offer 
them funds at fair terms. Moreover, he can commit to making direct lump-sum transfers, 
τ , from the G-type to the B-type so that the B-type effort incentive constraint and the 
social planner feasibility constraint are just binding, and the G-type effort incentive 
constraint is not violated. Mathematically,  
                                                 
37 In our model, convertible debt does not improve on a debt-equity combination (see Footnote 6).  
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                                              cIX BCB =−− )( τπ                                                        (20) 
 
                                              cIX GCG ≥−− )( τπ                                                        (21) 
 
                                            0)1( =−+ BCGC τπλτλπ                                                     (22) 
 
Solving (20) and (21) for Bτ  and Gτ  respectively and substituting into (22), we obtain: 
 
                                         2)(
)( λλπ
πλ =≡−
−−≥ SP
BGC
BC
XX
cXI
                                             (23) 
 
Where  is the minimum proportion of the G-type (subsidizer) in the population of 
entrepreneurs consistent with both types exerting effort. In fact, it is the only restriction 
on the parameter values the social planner faces in his attempt to implement the socially 
efficient outcome. That is, the optimal contract involves the resolution of the adverse 
selection problem and lump-sum transfers.  
SPλ
 
7.2. Implementing the Optimal Contract with Debt and Warrants 
 
Now that we have characterized the optimal contract, we examine its implementation as a 
competitive equilibrium using financial instruments observed in the real world. By 
Proposition 5, we know that, for any SPλλλ =≥ 2  there exists a pooling equilibrium 
where both types exert effort and receive funds by issuing a debt-warrant combination. 
That is, the only restriction on parameter values required for the existence of the socially 
efficient pooling equilibrium is that the social planner also faces. Therefore, debt coupled 
with a warrant can implement the optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium. 
     This result relies on two factors: First, on the fact that warrants allow for the 
intersection of the two effort incentive frontiers at some admissible value of the two 
choice variables, the proportion of equity, η , and the face value of debt, . This, in turn, 
implies that the socially efficient pooling equilibrium exists until the proportion of the G-
type becomes so low that it is impossible to satisfy both effort incentive constraints. This 
is exactly the constraint the social planner faces. Second, on the fact that the socially 
efficient pooling equilibrium Pareto-dominates any other equilibrium even if both effort 
incentive constraints are just binding. In other words, the G-type’s benefit from inducing 
the B-type to exert effort through the mispricing of warrants more than offsets the 
incremental subsidy (relative to the all-debt equilibrium where the B-type shirks) even if 
the total subsidy is so high that the G-type effort incentive constraint is just binding.
D
38  
  
 
 
                                                 
38 See also the Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5 in the Appendix.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we consider project financing under adverse selection and (effort) moral 
hazard. Several interesting results are obtained. First, we provide an explanation of why 
good firms issue underpriced equity even though the bankruptcy and other agency costs 
associated with debt are zero. This mispricing provides bad entrepreneurs with the 
subsidy necessary to induce them to exert effort. The resulting increase in the aggregate 
expected return leads to a fall in the interest rate on debt (gain) which is greater than the 
underpricing of equity. That is, good firms accept to incur the adverse selection cost of 
issuing equity because this cost is more than offset by the benefit from relaxing the moral 
hazard constraint. Second, we showed that, in the presence of moral hazard, this 
mispricing may result in the conversion of a negative into a positive NPV project and an 
improvement in the aggregate expected returns and social welfare. Third, we provide a 
rationale for the necessity of the use of warrants. Warrants allow for the implementation 
of the socially efficient outcome even if this is not possible when only debt, equity and/or 
convertible debt are available.  
     Finally, our results have also some implications for empirical testing: i) The higher the 
proportion of low-profitability (B-type) firms, the higher the fraction of funds raised 
through equity. This prediction is consistent with the findings in Fama and French 
(2005). ii) As the proportion of low-profitability firms rises, warrants should become a 
more important financing instrument. To the best of our knowledge, this prediction has 
not been tested yet. iii) Because the G-type equity is more valuable, ex post, good firms 
have lower debt-equity ratios (market values). This negative relation between leverage 
and profitability has been documented by several empirical studies (e.g., Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002)).  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  a) By totally differentiating Eq. (3), we obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) 01 =−−−− dDdDX i αα             ⇒ 01 <−
−−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
DXdD
d
iICFi
αα  
 
Taking into account that  implicitly defines iICF α  as a function of , we obtain:    D
 
( )
( )
( ) 0
121
222
2
<−
−−=−+−
−−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
DXDX
dD
d
DXdD
d
iiiICFi
α
α
αα  
 
Hence,  is downward sloping and strictly concave. Also, since ,  is 
flatter than .  
iICF BG XX > GICF
BICF
 
b) The effort incentive frontiers of the G- and B-type are respectively: 
 
                                                  cDX G =−− ))(1( α                                                     (A1) 
 
                                                  cDX B =−− ))(1( α                                                      (A2) 
 
Because , the intersection of  with the vertical axis lies below that of 
. Also,  at any 
BG XX > BICF
GICF 10 ≤≤α ,  is steeper than . Therefore,  lies entirely 
below  in the 
BICF GICF BICF
GICF ),( Dα  space. That is, . GB ICIC ⊂
 
c)  meets the vertical axis at iICF ii Xc−= 1α  and the horizontal axis at cXD ii −= . 
By Assumption 1,  and cX i > iXc>1 . Also, by Part (a) of this Lemma,  is 
downward sloping and strictly concave. Therefore,  cannot be empty (See Figure 
1).   Q.E.D. 
iICF
iIC
 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: a) For any 10 ≤≤α , iXD ≤≤0 , Eq. (1) becomes: 
 
                        ( )( )( )DXCU iii −−= απ 1 ,                                       
(A3)   
BGi ,=
       
Differentiating (A3), we obtain: 
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01 ≤−
−−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
= DXdD
d
iuui
αα  
 
uui =  implicitly defines α  as a function of  and so: D
 
( )
( ) 0
12
22
2
≤−
−−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
= DXdD
d
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Hence, the indifference curves of both the G- and the B-type are downward sloping and 
concave.  
 
b) Since , at any BG XX > ( D, )α  pair,  is flatter than  and hence they cross only 
once.           Q.E.D. 
Gu Bu
                                                                                                                               
 
Proof of Lemma 3: a) The equations for  and  are respectively:      iZP HPZP
                 
                                     [ ] IDDX iC =+− )(απ ,      BGi ,=                                         (A4) 
 
                     [ ] [ ] IDDXDDX BCGC =+−−++− )()1()( απλαλπ                          (A5) 
 
Differentiating (A4) and (A5) we obtain the slopes of  and  respectively.  iZP HPZP
 
01 <−
−−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
DXdD
d
iZPi
αα  
 
0
))(1()(
)1( <−−+−
−−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
DXDXdD
d
BGPZPH
λλ
αα
 
 
 
b)  Using (A4), (A5) and solving for α  and , we obtain the values of D α  and  where 
 and  intersect in the 
D
GZP BZP ),( Dα  space. 
 
                                                    0ˆ =α ,      CID π=ˆ                                                   (A6) 
 
Also,  is flatter than . Hence, for GZP BZP 0>α   lies below  in the GZP BZP ),( Dα  
space. 
Since  and BG XX > 10 ≤≤ λ , it is obvious that at any given ( )D,α  pair, 
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c) By Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 
 
                    01 <−
−−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
= DXdD
d
dD
d
dD
d
iZPuuICF iii
αααα ,      BGi ,=                  (A7) 
 
Hence, , ,  ( ) never intersect.   Q.E.D. iICF iu iZP BGi ,=
 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: If cIX CiC ππ ≥− , then the intersection point of  with the 
vertical axis, (
iZP
iC XI π ), lies (weakly) below that of , (iICF iXc−1 ). By Lemma 3,  
and  never intersect (they may coincide). Therefore,  belongs to  and hence it 
exists. Conversely, if 
iZP
iICF iZP iIC
cIX CiC ππ <− , then  lies outside  and so it does not exist. 
In the latter case, if the i type obtains funds at fair terms, his effort incentive constraint is 
violated and so he opts for shirking contradicting the condition ( ) on which  
is constructed.   Q.E.D.    
iZP iIC
i
C
i ππ = iZP
 
 
Proof of Lemma 6: The equations of the effort incentive frontiers  and  are 
given respectively by: 
BICF GICF
 
                                                 cDX B =−− ))(1( ψη                                                     (A8) 
 
                                cXXDX BGG =−−−−− ))(1())(1( ψηψη                                   (A9) 
 
a) By totally differentiating (A8) and (A9), we obtain the slopes of  and  
respectively (the equations are provided in the text). Since , at any given 
BICF GICF
BG XX >
),( Dη  pair,  is steeper than .  BICF GICF
 
b) Solving (A8) and (A9) for η  and , we obtain: D
 
                    1=η ,       [ ]
))(1(
)()1()(
BG
BGBGB
XX
XcXXXcXD −−
−−−−−= ψ
ψψ
                   (A10)   
                                                                                    
                                         0≥D      ⇔   ψψ ≡−≤ BXc1                               
(A11) 
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c) Setting the utility (Eq. (11) in the text) of an entrepreneur of type i equal to a constant 
and differentiating, we obtain the slopes of the indifference curves which are identical 
to the corresponding slopes of the effort incentive frontiers.   Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: By Lemma 4, in this case,  lies above , , and so 
we can proceed with the analysis ignoring the effort incentive constraints. Let  
be the equilibrium pair of contracts (in a pooling equilibrium 
iICF iZP BGi ,=
),( BG AA
AAA BG == ). We test 
whether the pair  or ),( BG AA A  is an equilibrium by considering deviations.        
     Clearly, offers below  are unprofitable. Also, any offer along  (to the left of 
point 
GZP GZP
A ) would attract both types and so is loss-making. Thus, there cannot exist a 
separating equilibrium where the G-type issues equity. We next show that there cannot 
exist a pooling equilibrium where equity is issued. If there exists a pooling equilibrium it 
must lie on the pooling zero-profit curve ( ). Suppose that the pooling equilibrium 
contract is contract N that lies on  to the left of point 
HPZP
HPZP A  (see Figure A1). Consider 
now the following deviation: A financier offers a contract just below N in the area 
between the indifference curve of the two types through N. Given contract N is still 
offered, the deviant contract will reasonably attract only an G-type and so is profitable 
(since it lies above ). At the same time, contract N becomes loss-making and so any 
application for it would be rejected at Stage 3. Thus, contract N (any contract on  
to the left of point 
GZP
HPZP
A ) cannot be a pooling equilibrium. 
     Consider now a financier who deviates by offering a contract in the area between  
and . Given contract 
GZP
BZP A  is still offered, at Stage 3, the deviant financier will 
reasonably infer that his contract will be chosen by a B-type. As a result, the deviant 
contract is unprofitable (loss-making) and so any application for it will be rejected at 
Stage 3. Actually, anticipating the rejection of this application, no B-type would make it 
at Stage 2. Therefore, contract A  which involves both types issuing only debt is a 
pooling equilibrium (see Figure A1). Finally, any pair , where  and  ),( BG AA AAG = BA
 
 
                                        α                                                                   
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                                                                                     GZP
                                                             
                                                                                           
                                                                                                    
 HPZPN 
 
       
 
                •  
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Figure A1. Equilibria under pure adverse selection. 
 
lies on  to the left of BZP A , is a separating equilibrium. Because debt issued by both 
types at A  is fairly priced, the B-type is indifferent between issuing debt and any debt-
equity combination along . Also, given contract BZP A , the financiers are equally well 
off by offering any contract along  because, given contract BZP A , any such an offer is 
going to be taken only by the B-type. Thus, none of these separating pairs can be ruled 
out.39   Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: The pooling equilibria described in this proposition exist if the 
following two conditions are satisfied: a)  belongs to the intersection of  and 
 for 
HPZP BIC
GIC 1≤λ  and b) the G-type indifference curve through the equilibrium contract A , 
, does not intersect  (see Figure 3).  AGu LPZP
  
a) In the debt-equity case, since  the first condition is satisfied if  
crosses . Provided  intersects  (
GB ICIC ⊂ HPZP
BICF GZP BICF BRC XcXI −< 1π ), by Figure 3, it is 
clear that  crosses  if the intersection point of  with the vertical axis 
lies below that of . That is, if 
HPZP BICF HPZP
BICF
 
               
))1((
1
BGCB XX
I
X
c
λλπ −+>−      ⇔     1)1)((
)( λπ
πλ ≡−−
−−>
BBGC
BC
XcXX
cXI
 
   
        )( cXI BC −−π : Minimum subsidy required to induce the B-type to exert effort. 
 
        )( BGC XX −π : Expected return differential (given the high effort level is chosen). 
 
        BXc−1 : Maximum BIC∈α  
 
b) Regarding the second condition, since  and BG XX > 10 ≤≤ λ , at any given ( )D,α  
pair,  is flatter than . Therefore, it suffices to show that the intersection point 
of  with the horizontal axis lies to the left of that of . 
A
Gu LPZP
A
Gu LPZP
 
The intersection point of  with the horizontal axis is given by: LPZP
                                                 
39 These equilibria also obtain in a two-stage signalling or screening game. 
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0)1( πλλπ −+= C
ID                                                  (A12)   
 
Moreover, the expected utility of the G-type in equilibrium is given by: 
 
                                                                                         (A13) )()1( ∗∗∗ −−= DXU GCG πα
 
At 0=α , the G-type’s expected utility is: 
 
                                                 ( ) )(0 DXU GCG −== πα                                                (A14) 
 
Setting  and using the expressions for  and , we obtain: ( ) 0=∗ = αGG UU ∗α ∗D
 
                                               
C
BC cXID λπ
πλ )()1( −−−=                                            (A15) 
 
Hence, the second condition is satisfied if: 
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C
cXII
λπ
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C
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then    ( ) [ ] 0)(12 <−−−=′ cXIf BC
C
ππλλ ,    ( ) [ ] 0)(
2
3 >−−=′′ cXIf BC
C
ππλλ  
 
 
Since, by assumption, ( ) 0>−− cXI BCπ . 
 
 
Also,   ( ) ( )( )[ ] 01 20
0 <−+
−−=′ πλλπ
ππλ
C
C Ig ,    ( ) ( )( )[ ] 01 30
2
0 >−+
−=′′ πλλπ
ππλ
C
C Ig  
 
 
Since 0ππ >C , both ( )λf  and ( )λg  are strictly decreasing and strictly convex. 
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Furthrermore, ( ) ( )λλ gf ≤       ⇒ 1≤λ     and     λ
π
πππ
πλ ~
)()(
)(
0
0
≡
−−
−−≥
cX
cXI
B
C
C
BC  
 
Since i) 10 ≤≤ λ , ii) both ( )λf  and ( )λg  are continuous, strictly decreasing and strictly 
convex, iii) ( ) ( )λλ gf ≤  for λλ ~≥  and ( ) ( )λλ gf >  for λλ ~< , then ( ) ( )λλ gf ≤  for all [ ]1,~λλ ∈ . Therefore,  does not cut  for any AGu LPZP [ ]1,1λλ ∈  if and only if: 
 
                                    λλ ~1 ≥       ⇔    BCG XX ππ ≤0                                                (A17) 
 
By Assumption 1, this condition is always satisfied.   Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: Similarly, the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 5 exists if the 
following two conditions are satisfied: 
 
                                                      SPλλλ =≥ 2                                                            (A18) 
 
                                                 CXX BGC ≥− 0ππ                                                      (A19) 
 
By Assumption 1, the second condition is always satisfied. The first condition 
( SPλλλ =≥ 2 ) is identical to that the social planner faces. Therefore, a debt-warrant 
combination can implement the optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium.   Q.E.D.                                  
 
 
Separate Debt and Equity (Warrant) Markets 
 
The analysis in the text assumed that the required amount of funds I is provided by the 
same financier who purchases both debt and equity (warrant). In this appendix, we show 
that all the results go through even if the buyer of debt and the buyer of equity (warrant) 
are different (debt and equity (warrant) markets are separate). It suffices to show that the 
zero-profit curves of an equity-buyer (a warrant-buyer), a debt-buyer and a financier 
purchasing both debt and equity (warrant) coincide. The following assumptions are made: 
 
  i)  The project is indivisible.  
 ii)  Entrepreneurs cannot lend and the consumption good is perishable. 
iii)  Debt and equity (warrant) markets are perfectly competitive. 
 
The first assumption implies that the entrpreneurs borrow at least I. The second implies 
that no entrepreneur will borrow more than I. Therefore, entrepreneurs borrow just I. 
Given these three assumptions, we have: 
 
                                                      III ED =+                                                        (A20)     
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                  [ ] 0)1( =−−+= DkjDF IDP πλλπ ,    0,Cj = ,   0,Ck = ,                       (A21) 
 
                      [ ] 0)()1()( =−−−+−= EBkGjEF IDXDXP πλλπα                             (A22) 
 
           [ ] [ ] 0)()1()( =−+−−++−= IDDXDDXP kBkjGjF παπλπαπλ             (A23) 
 
where   : Amount the entrepreneur borrows from the debt-financier DI
             : Amount the entrepreneur borrows from the equity-financier     EI
          : Expected profit of the debt-financier DFP
          : Expected profit of the equity-financier EFP
            :  Expected profit of a financier purchasing both debt and equity  FP
 
Using (A20), (A21), (A22) and (A23) we obtain:  
 
                       [ ] [ ] IDDXDDX kBkjGj −+−−++− παπλπαπλ )()1()(  
 
                                                 0==== FDFEF PPP                                                 
(A24)           
  
That is, the zero-profit curves of an equity-financier, a debt-financier and a financier 
purchasing both debt and equity coincide. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium of 
Proposition 4 obtains regardless of whether the same investor purchases both debt and 
equity and provides the required amount I or the debt-financier and the equity-financier 
are different (bond and equity markets are separate).  
     Similar results can be derived for the individual zero-profit curves. Also, all the results 
go through if debt and warrants are issued instead of debt and equity.  
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